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CONTINUING RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS: QUESTIONING 
BURDENS ON PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT IN NEW JERSEY 
Jason Rindosh* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
  It is amazing how the English language contains some words 
so inherently ambiguous that they can only be properly defined by 
contextual examples.  “Liberty,” a treasured term used in both the 
Federal Constitution and state constitutions in the United States,1 is 
perhaps one term that can only be superficially understood until 
placed in context.  The meaning of such an open term, capable of 
expansive or narrow interpretation, would have only semantic value if 
it were not for the legal protections that the Federal Constitution and 
other state constitutions afford against deprivations of liberty.2  The 
interpretive meaning ascribed to the term liberty is thus more than 
for sake of clarification or philosophical exercise, it is the 
constitutional rule. 
This Comment addresses a narrow issue that implicates both 
federal and state constitutional concerns involving the scope of the 
word liberty.  It specifically proffers that the term liberty ought to 
imbue every publicly employed individual with a constitutionally 
protected fundamental right to choose where to make his abode, 
spend his free time, and raise his family, without the threat of being 
discharged or foreclosed of opportunities from public employ.  The 
only necessary exception to this rule should render unprotected 
those private decisions that impede the employee from fulfilling the 
duties of his or her position.  The heart of the issue can be framed 
generally as “whether the government may compel an individual to 
 
* J.D. Candidate, May 2012, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2005, 
Rowan University.  Thank you Professor Robert Martin for your helpful assistance 
and guidance and my father and mother for all they have ever done. 
 1  See, e.g., U.S. CONST. pmbl. (The purpose of the Constitution was partly “to 
form a more perfect Union . . . and secure the Blessings of Liberty.”); N.J. CONST. art. 
I, § 1 (All people have an inalienable right “of enjoying and defending life and 
liberty.”); N.C. CONST. art. I, § 1 (It is “self-evident that all persons . . . are 
endowed . . . with certain inalienable rights . . . among these . . . liberty.”). 
 2  See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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live within its boundaries as a condition of continued employment.”3 
For clarity, it is important to distinguish among the various types 
of residency requirements at the outset.  Continuing residency 
requirements must first be distinguished from durational residency 
requirements both in terms of the definition and the constitutional 
analysis that the majority of courts apply.4  Durational residency 
requirements apportion benefits or impose hardships differently 
among residents that have lived in a jurisdiction for some defined 
period of time and those that have recently moved within the 
jurisdictional scope of the applicable law.5  In Shapiro v. Thompson, the 
U.S. Supreme Court determined that a durational residency 
requirement imposing a one-year waiting period prior to the receipt 
of welfare benefits impinged on “the fundamental right of interstate 
movement” and applied an intermediate level of constitutional 
scrutiny requiring that the law further a compelling state interest.6 
Contrary to the durational variety, continuing residency 
requirements, of the variety pertaining to employment, require 
residency within an identifiable geographically defined area, whether 
a city, county, or state, as a condition precedent to the receipt and 
continuation of employment.7  These requirements apply only to 
those individuals who are publicly employed, and approximately 
twenty-four percent of cities within the United States currently force a 
public employee to live within city limits as part of a continuing 
residency requirement.8  Residency requirements can and have been 
enacted through various legislative means, including state statute, 
municipal ordinance,9 or municipal charter.10 
 
 3  See Abrahams v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 319 A.2d 483, 501 (N.J. 1974) (Pashman, 
J., dissenting). 
 4  See Ector v. City of Torrance, 514 P.2d 433, 437 (Cal. 1973) (noting that 
continuing residency requirements utilize residency as a condition precedent to the 
receipt of a benefit whereas durational requirements have this requirement in 
addition to a waiting period necessary to the receipt of the benefit). 
 5  See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969) (providing a 
description of the functioning of durational residency requirements in the form of a 
waiting-period for the receipt of welfare benefits for newly arrived residents). 
 6  Id. at 638. 
 7  See, e.g., Kennedy v. City of Newark, 148 A.2d 473, 475 (N.J. 1959) (reviewing 
an ordinance for the city of Newark that required “all of its officers and employees to 
reside in the city as a condition for continued employment”).  Sometimes these 
requirements will allow a newly hired employee a graced period during which he or 
she is required to comply with the requirement.  See discussion infra Part II.B.1. 
 8  See Brian Duncan, Using Municipal Residency Requirements to Disguise Public Policy, 
33 PUB. FIN. REV. 84, 84 (2005). 
 9  See, e.g., CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUN. CODE ch. 308, §§ 83(a)–(b) (2010) (requiring 
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Regardless of the precise legislative means utilized to enact the 
requirement, continuing residency requirements can be further 
bifurcated into two variations.  The first variation, the targeted 
residency requirement, imputes the requirement on a class of 
employees for a specific purpose stemming from the unique duties 
and obligations required by the employment position.11  For example, 
police officers, as a class, may be required to live in a city in light of a 
public policy determination that they are implicitly obligated to 
remain actively protective of the community during off-duty hours.12  
A “comprehensive residency law,” by contrast, “requires all municipal 
employees hired after the law is enacted to live in the city.”13  
Comprehensive and targeted residency laws can be more expansive 
than a limitation of residency to a city, however, such as requiring 
residency in a state or county for all employees as a condition of 
employment.14  The geographic area delineated by the requirement 
naturally corresponds to one aspect relevant to determining the 
scope of the burden.15  In terms of constitutional treatment, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has applied a rational basis level of scrutiny in 
upholding targeted residency requirements for police officers against 
challenges levied under the Equal Protection Clause.16  The U.S. 
Supreme Court has further rejected the argument that a residency 
 
any employee of the city to reside in the state of Ohio; requiring firefighters and 
police to live within the city or an adjacent county to fulfill duties in the event of an 
emergency; and further requiring “senior executive officers” to reside within the city 
because necessary to fulfill obligations owed to the city). 
 10  See, e.g., CLEVELAND, OHIO, CITY CHARTER ch. 11, § 74(a) (1982) (providing 
that all employees of the city must live within its geographic boundaries). 
 11  Duncan, supra note 8, at 87. 
 12  See Detroit Police Officers Ass’n v. City of Detroit, 190 N.W.2d 97, 98 (Mich. 
1971), appeal dismissed, 405 U.S. 950 (1972) (noting the fact that Detroit police 
officers were required to carry weapons at all times, including off duty hours, which 
evidenced a specific need for police officers to be present and active in the 
community during their off-duty hours).  This point will be further explicated as part 
of an argument that the obligations and duties of being a police officer are easily 
differentiated from other classes of public employees.  See infra Part III.B.4. 
 13  Duncan, supra note 8, at 87. 
 14  See CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUN. CODE ch. 308, § 83(a) (requiring all employees of 
the city to reside in the state of Ohio). 
 15  Aside from the geographic area, the scope of applicable persons is determined 
by what classes of employees are covered. Naturally, comprehensive residence 
requirements are the most onerous in this respect as they affect every class of 
employee. 
 16  See Detroit Police Officers Ass’n, 405 U.S. 950 (implying that rational basis review 
was appropriate as utilized by the Michigan Supreme Court for residency 
requirements of police officers). 
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requirement targeting firefighters infringes upon a fundamental 
right to travel protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause.17  
Both cases that the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed pertained to 
targeted, rather than comprehensive, residency requirements.  These 
targeted residency requirements can be further narrowed to classes of 
employees obligated to perform public safety functions. 
The propriety of residency requirements has also been 
considered at the state level.18  After the financial meltdown of 2008, 
the New Jersey legislature proposed various comprehensive residency 
requirements effectively requiring any public employee working in 
New Jersey to live in the state as a condition of employment.19  The 
original proposal sought to amend the existing statute, N.J.S.A. § 
52:14-7,20 to require that any person employed or holding a position 
in the state of New Jersey make his or her principal residency in the 
state.21  Principal residency is defined in the bill as the place “where 
the person spends the majority of his or her nonworking time, 
and . . . which is most clearly the center of his or her domestic life, 
and . . . which is designated as his or her legal address and legal 
residence for voting.”22  The bill, as first introduced, also provided 
that anyone obtaining employment or a position within the state 
would be temporarily exempt from the requirement for one year or 
for a period of four months from the point of assuming an office or 
position.23  Persons already employed by the state in violation of the 
requirement would also have a grace period of two years and six 
 
 17  McCarthy v. Phila. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 424 U.S. 645, 646–47 (1976) (per 
curiam) (holding that a similar requirement for a firefighter of the city of 
Philadelphia does not violate the interstate right to travel under Shapiro’s precedent). 
 18  See, e.g., Assemb., A2515, 213th Leg., (N.J. 2008). 
 19  Id. Introduced on March 8th, this bill was comprehensive and contained 
exemptions for persons with specialized skill and a period of deferral for financial 
hardship.  Id.  This bill was later combined with A3808 and adopted in a substantially 
less comprehensive form on January 4th, 2010.  See Assemb., A2515/A3808, 213th 
Leg. (N.J. 2010). 
 20  S. S1730, 214th Leg. (N.J. 2010). 
 21  Id.  The scope of the original bill covered virtually every employee as it applied 
to any person holding an office or position in any branch of the State government, 
or “with an authority, board, body, agency, commission . . . or instrumentality of the 
State including any State college, university or other educational institution, or . . . 
with a county, municipality, or other political subdivision of the State or an authority, 
board, body, agency, district, commission, or instrumentality of the county, 
municipality, or subdivision.”  Id. 
 22  Id. 
 23  Id. 
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months to comply with the requirement under the original bill.24  
Finally, the bill provided that any person violating the requirement 
for a 365-day period would be subject to judicial ouster if “any officer 
or citizen of the state” brings an action within a year of the violation.25 
On May 13, 2010, the New Jersey Senate approved the “New 
Jersey First Act” proposal that Senators Norcross and O’Toole26 first 
initiated.27  The Senate Committee substitute that was approved on 
May 13, 2010 included some substantial changes to the structure of 
the original bill.28  Important changes included an exemption for all 
persons currently holding public employment positions so long as 
they did not “voluntarily” change their “employment, office, or 
position.”29  Further, the bill was altered to include a separate 
exemption for “any person . . . employed on a temporary or per-
semester basis as a visiting professor, teacher, lecturer, or researcher 
by any State college, university, other educational institution” and for 
persons with job duties that require them to spend the majority of 
their working time outside of the state.30  The final variations adopted 
in the Senate Committee substitute also sought to create a three-
member panel “composed of a person appointed by the Governor, a 
person appointed by the Speaker of the General Assembly, and a 
person appointed by the President of the Senate” to consider 
applications for residency exemptions.31  Though later abandoned, 
the Senate’s initial contemplations regarding the types of exemptions 
granted seemed to portend that they would be limited to individuals 
working at universities who “hold a position requiring special 
 
 24  Id. 
 25  Id. 
 26  S. S1730, 214th Leg., S. Comm. Substitute (N.J. 2010). 
 27  S. S1730, 214th Leg., (N.J. 2010). Senators Norcross and O’Toole initially 
made the proposal on March 11, 2009. 
 28  S. S1730, 214th Leg., S. Comm. Substitute (N.J. 2010). An identical bill was 
introduced to the New Jersey Assembly on March 8, 2010.  See Assemb., A2478, 214th 
Leg. (N.J. 2010). 
 29  S. S1730, 214th Leg., S. Comm. Substitute (N.J. 2010).  An example of an 
involuntary change in position would be forced reassignment.  Id.  Most residency 
requirements, assuming they have not been on the books for some extended period 
of time, offer an amnesty for individuals living outside the required area holding 
employment positions prior to enactment.  See Lorenz v. Logue, 611 F.2d 421, 423 
(2d Cir. 1979) (acknowledging Judge Burns’s observation that a clause exempting 
employees hired prior to the residency requirement while imposing the requirement 
on newly hired employees was “the least disruptive and most humane method” to 
implement a residency requirement). 
 30  S. S1730, 214th Leg., S. Comm. Substitute (N.J. 2010). 
 31  Id. 
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expertise or extraordinary qualifications in a scientific or technical 
area.”32  The Senate Committee substitute required that the three-
member committee give applications from persons with such 
expertise or extraordinary qualifications “particular attention” and 
consider how denying the individual an exemption would be 
injurious to New Jersey’s ability to “compete successfully” with 
scientific and technical colleges and schools of other states.33 
After the New Jersey State Assembly approved the bill, Governor 
Chris Christie commended “the sponsors for their efforts to increase 
employment opportunities for New Jersey residents” in his 
conditional veto.34  The conditional veto was limited to a concern that 
the three-member panel reviewing hardship applications needed to 
be revamped to establish an “appropriate review process” capable of 
dealing with the expected volume of applications.35  The New Jersey 
Senate was in its second reading and, likely considering the concerns 
of Governor Christie’s conditional veto, made some final changes to 
the bill.36  The New Jersey First Act was approved on March 17, 2011, 
and became effective starting September 1, 2011.37 
The enacted New Jersey First Act retained much of the substance 
of the Senate Committee substitute.38  The Act maintained the same 
definition of “principal residence” and the comprehensive 
application to any person “holding office, employment, or position” 
in the State of New Jersey.39  The exemption for certain employees at 
institutions of higher education, as well as the exemption for persons 
spending the majority of their working hours outside of the State, 
were also incorporated in the final bill.40  Perhaps to facilitate an 
efficient review of the higher education exemption, the bill requires 
that each university or institution provide a report enumerating the 
full- and part-time positions exempt and the reasons for the claimed 
 
 32  Id. 
 33  Id. Some classes of employees and positions, specifically the head of a 
principle department of the executive branch and any judge of the State Supreme 
Court, Superior Court, or any other lower court created by the laws of the state, are 
categorically barred from applying for the exemption.  Id. 
 34  S. S1730, 214th Conditional Veto (N.J. 2011). 
 35  Id. 
 36  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14-7 (West 2010) 
 37  Id. 
 38  Compare S. S1730, 214th Leg., S. Comm. Substitute (N.J. 2010), with N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 52:14-7 (West 2010). 
 39  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14-7 (West 2010). 
 40  Id. 
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exemption.41  By reviewing the exemptions by position instead of on 
an individual basis, the reviewing panel should be able to more 
efficiently review applications as was of concern for Governor 
Christie. 
The most monumental decisions made with respect to the New 
Jersey First Act were twofold.  First, the final bill included a 
grandfather clause.42  Under the grandfather clause, any person 
holding office, employment, or a position with the state and having a 
principal residence outside the state will not be affected by the 
residency requirement so long as that individual is “without a break 
in public service of greater than seven days.”43  Second, the New 
Jersey First Act enlarged the committee to review applications from 
three members to five and empowered it to grant exemptions “on the 
basis of critical need or hardship.”44  Perhaps seeking to respond to 
Governor Christie’s plea for greater committee efficiency, any 
application the five-member committee fails to act upon within thirty 
days is automatically subject to the residency requirement.45  
Structurally, the committee is comprised of three appointees from 
the Governor, one from the Speaker of the General Assembly, and a 
final member appointed by the President of the Senate.46  Each 
appointment lasts a term not to exceed five years.47  As this five-
member committee has the power to designate who can avoid the 
requirement as a critical hardship, the committee’s interpretation 
and construal of “critical hardship” will determine the breadth of the 
exemption. 
Since New Jersey has passed its first comprehensive statewide 
residency requirement affecting all current48 and future public 
employees of the state, questions of whether the law is constitutional, 
and perhaps more important, prudent, are implicated.  Although this 
 
 41  Id.  The initial report was to be filed within sixty days of the effective date of 
September 1, 2011.  Id. 
 42  Id. 
 43  Id. 
 44  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14-7 (West 2010). 
 45  Id.  Indubitably, the standard could have been to accept rather than reject any 
application the committee failed to act upon.  It is relatively unknown what volume 
of hardship exemptions will be requested at this time. 
 46  § 52:14-7. 
 47  Id. 
 48  Even with the incorporation of the grandfather requirement, the New Jersey 
First Act still burdens any employee residing outside the State as he or she could face 
termination after a break in public service lasting longer than one week. 
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Comment focuses primarily on the constitutional implications of 
imposing a comprehensive state residency requirement on all 
employees of New Jersey, the constitutional and policy arguments set 
forth would similarly apply to residency requirements limited to a 
county or municipality.49 
Part II of this Comment traces the history and use of residency 
requirements, with a particularized focus on the jurisprudence of the 
U.S. Supreme Court and the New Jersey Supreme Court with regard 
to continuing residency requirements for public employees.  Part III 
analyzes potential constitutional arguments, under both the New 
Jersey and Federal Constitutions, and other policy-based arguments 
that could potentially invalidate a comprehensive statewide residency 
requirement like the New Jersey First Act under an Equal Protection, 
Privileges and Immunities, or Dormant Commerce Clause 
constitutional challenge.  Part IV provides a summary of the New 
Jersey First Act and the constitutional and policy-based concerns of 
imposing a comprehensive residency requirement on all public 
employees.  As a general conclusion, this Comment surmises that the 
passing of a comprehensive statewide residency requirement for New 
Jersey, albeit perhaps imprudent, will likely withstand constitutional 
challenges whether brought under the New Jersey or Federal 
Constitution. 
II. THE HISTORY AND JURISPRUDENCE OF CONTINUING RESIDENCY 
REQUIREMENTS 
A. The Legislative and Policy Component to Continuing Residency 
Requirements 
Both durational and continuing residency requirements have a 
long history stretching back to the English feudal system that 
subsequently became American norms incorporated and learned 
through the British colonies.50  In 1601, Parliament passed An Act for 
 
 49  I make this statement willfully admitting the argument cannot be as neatly 
levied against city, county, or municipal residency requirements depending on the 
argument considered.  For example, a claim under the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause is stronger with respect to a statewide comprehensive residency requirement, 
such as the New Jersey First Act, if one perceives the scope of the clause as not 
applying to intrastate travel.  See generally Andrew C. Porter, Comment, Toward a 
Constitutional Analysis of the Right to Intrastate Travel, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 820, 836–37 
(1992) (speculating that a right to intrastate travel could call into question the 
constitutionality of a multitude of local laws, including residency requirements). 
 50  CHARLES S. RHYNE, WILLIAM S. RHYNE & STEPHAN P. ELMENDORF, THE 
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the Relief of the Poor as part of the Elizabethan Poor Laws, which 
created parishes to coordinate aid to the local poor.51  In 1662, 
Parliament passed An Act for the Better Relief of the Poor of this 
Kingdom, giving local justices the ability to return newly arrived poor 
to their place of origin within forty days of arrival if the individual was 
viewed as becoming a burden upon the town.52  The 1662 Act 
instituted a durational residency requirement that was inherently 
protectionist of the local tax base by allowing the return of a poor, 
sick, or otherwise incapable individual to his or her place of origin.53  
This effectively forced each community to bear the tax burden of its 
own poor.54  Since the birthplace of illegitimate children served as 
their places of return if they happened to become poor and tax 
burdens on the community, local parish leaders were incentivized to 
send an unwed pregnant woman to another parish immediately prior 
to giving birth or to bribe a man from another parish to marry her.55 
Though originating in England, continuing residency 
requirements developed their own history in the United States.  By 
the late 1800s, these requirements had become widely disseminated 
as a means of creating a restricted class of public employment 
positions in the police force or city hall that could be farmed out to 
those who paid patronage to the alderman victor in earlier periods of 
political uncertainty.56  In return, the alderman57 received a reliable 
vote in future elections because the individual’s employment position 
depended directly on the alderman’s future success.58  Additionally, 
the alderman could rely on the loyalty of these individuals for law 
enforcement investigations, obtaining bribes, or collecting protection 
money, with the public employees receiving their own personal gains 
in the form of “kickbacks” and job security.59 
In an attempt to obviate the past mechanisms of political 
 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS FOR MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS AND 
EMPLOYEES 45 (1977). 
 51  An Act for the Relief of the Poor, 1601, 43 Eliz. 1, c. 2 (Eng.). 
 52  An Act for the Better Relief of the Poor of this Kingdom, 1662, 14 Car. 2, c. 12 
§ 1, 2 (Eng.). 
 53  See Peter Higginbotham, The Poor Laws, THE WORKHOUSE (2012), 
http://www.workhouses.org.uk/poorlaws. 
 54  See id. 
 55  Id. 
 56  WILLIAM ANDERSON, AMERICAN CITY GOVERNMENT (1925). 
 57  An “alderman,” also known as an “alderperson,” is “a member of a city council 
or other local governing body.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
 58  ANDERSON, supra note 56. 
 59  Id. 
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corruption, proposals to institute a merit-based system of pay came to 
be viewed as a potential solution to onerous residency requirements.60  
Despite evidence of early advocacy against continuing residency 
requirements, cities around the country, with the exception of 
Berkeley and Washington, retained their residency requirements for 
police officers.61  When World War II created a shortage of eligible 
police officers in Dallas, however, the city was forced to abandon its 
targeted residency requirement to recruit a sufficient number of 
officers.62  After Portland removed its comprehensive residency 
requirement in the early 1960s by way of charter amendment, New 
York and Boston followed suit upon subsequently removing their 
residency requirements.63  Only a few big cities retained their 
residency requirements by the late 1960s.64  In other cities and parts 
of the country, residency requirements were kept on the book but 
remained widely unenforced.65 
As residency requirements were being retracted or not enforced, 
critics pressed on with arguments that the requirements were needed 
to alleviate the cities’ financial distress, to maintain racial balance 
within the police force, and to improve the quality of law 
enforcement.66  Their campaign was unsuccessful in most areas 
during the early 1970s, with the exception of Detroit and Los 
Angeles.67  When the horrendous fiscal situation of the early 1970s 
surfaced, however, cities reevaluated and began to, again, enforce 
their residency requirements.68  Mayor Beame of New York pleaded 
for a city-wide comprehensive residency requirement, believing that 
the fiscal plight and rampant unemployment in the city created an 
entitlement right to municipal jobs for people living within city 
limits.69 
 
 60  See Wisc. Policy Research Inst., The Milwaukee Teacher Residency Requirement: Why 
It’s Bad for Schools, and Why It Won’t Go Away, 19 WIS. POL’Y  RES. INST. REP. 5, 5 (June 
2006) [hereinafter MPS Report]. 
 61  See ROBERT S. FOGELSON, BIG-CITY POLICE 82 (1977); COMM. ON THE D.C., 
REMOVAL OF RESTRICTION ON RESIDENCE OF MEMBERS OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT, H.R. 
DOC. NO. 855, at 1–2 (1935). 
 62  See FOGELSON, supra note 61, at 182. 
 63  Id. 
 64  Brian R. Johnson, Greg L. Warchol & Vic W. Bumphus, Police Residential 
Requirements: An Exploratory Analysis, 26 J. COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS 43, 45 (1997). 
 65  See FOGELSON, supra note 61, at 182. 
 66  Id. at 306. 
 67  Id. at 307. 
 68  Id. 
 69  RESIDENCY PLAN GAIN IN COUNCIL: Would Limit Municipal Jobs to Workers 
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The reversion to residency requirements protectionist of local 
public employment has been attributed to the fiscal crisis many cities 
experienced during the early 1970s.70  Albeit with some exceptions, 
courts generally rejected early challenges to the constitutionality of 
residency requirements.71  The ability to use these requirements to 
insulate local public employment positions and create local jobs in 
hard economic times likely provided guidance to legislatures 
elsewhere and facilitated the subsequent widespread proliferation of 
these requirements. 
B. Judicial Discourse Regarding Continuing Residency Requirements 
1. The Kennedy Case and the Initial Challenge to 
Continuing Residency Requirements in New Jersey 
under the Equal Protection Clause 
Aside from unsuccessful political attempts to extinguish 
residency requirements, New Jersey jurisprudence has remained 
indubitably steadfast in deferring to legislative decisions, regardless of 
whether the plaintiff challenged a targeted or comprehensive 
residency requirement.  In Kennedy v. City of Newark, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court first confronted arguments regarding the 
constitutionality of a comprehensive residency requirement that had 
been enacted in Newark in 1932.72  The Newark ordinance required 
all public officers and employees to reside within the city’s limits.73  
After the disclosure information obtained from “loyalty oaths” 
revealed that 585 employees were non-residents in violation of the 
comprehensive requirement and therefore subject to termination, 
the disgruntled employees argued that the New Jersey State 
Constitution74 insulated the employees from loss of continued 
 
Living in City, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1975, at 35. 
 70  Peter K. Esinger, Municipal Residency Requirements and the Local Economy, 64 
SOC. SCI. Q. 85, 85–95 (1983). 
 71  Compare Trainor v. City of Newark, 368 A.2d 381, 385 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1976) (holding that Newark’s comprehensive residency requirement was not 
unconstitutional by virtue of statutory exemptions for police and firefighters), with 
Hanson v. Unified Sch. Dist., 364 F. Supp. 330, 334 (D. Kan. 1974) (holding a 
residency requirement for teachers unconstitutional under the Equal Protection 
Clause). 
 72  148 A.2d 473, 475 (N.J. 1959). 
 73  Id. 
 74  See N.J. CONST., art. I, para. 1 (“All persons are by nature free and 
independent, and have certain natural and unalienable rights, among which are 
those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and 
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employment.75  Chief Justice Weintraub framed the issue not as 
“whether a man is free to live where he will” but whether “he may live 
where he wishes and at the same time insist upon employment by 
government.”76  Although the requirement had never been enforced 
against a single resident despite being on the books for thirty-seven 
years prior to Kennedy, the New Jersey Supreme Court held for the 
city by reasoning that the “missing link” of “official knowledge” of the 
violations warranted enforcement against the plaintiff public 
employees.77 
The Kennedy decision was important because it established an 
early precedent in New Jersey that an equal protection argument 
under the State Constitution could not be utilized as a means of 
obviating a comprehensive residency requirement.  Additionally, the 
Court implicitly recognized that the rationale behind the ordinance 
could not have been merely to require emergency personnel to 
reside in the city in order to be responsive to emergency situations, as 
its application covered other public employees.78  Instead, the Court 
accorded deference to the decision that a comprehensive residency 
requirement could be legitimized under the “public coffer theory”79 
 
protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness.”). 
 75  Kennedy, 148 A.2d at 475. 
 76  Id. at 476. 
 77  Id.  This suggests that there would be some argument that would exculpate a 
plaintiff from the requirement upon a showing of both willful misfeasance and 
official knowledge of the act.  Justice Pashman, in a later dissent, reasoned that the 
presence of official knowledge of violations of some twenty-one employees 
constituted arbitrary discrimination that violated the Equal Protection Clause and 
rendered the ordinance imputing the residency requirement unenforceable.  See 
Abrahams v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 319 A.2d 473, 503–04 (N.J. 1974) (Pashman, J., 
dissenting). 
 78  The classes of employees that come to mind when considering this targeted 
residency requirement would be EMT personnel, firefighters, police officers, and 
other public employment positions necessitating a response during emergency 
situations. 
 79  See People v. Crane, 108 N.E. 427, 429 (N.Y. 1915), affirmed, 239 U.S. 195 
(1915) (providing for a “principle of exclusion” allowing “the restriction of the 
resources of the state to the advancement and profit of the members of the state”).  
But see Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971) (rejecting the public interest 
doctrine of conditioning the receipt of a State benefit on the receipt of tax 
contributions); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 632 (1969) (dismissing the 
rationale that a State could apportion a benefit between citizens classified based on 
past tax contributions).  It is worth noting that both of these decisions came after 
Kennedy, where the “public coffer” reasoning was accepted.  See Kennedy, 148 A.2d at 
476 (The court endorsed Newark’s ordinance on “common acceptance of the 
proposition that the Legislature may well find the public interest is advanced by 
residence within the political unit which provides the pay.”). 
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and upon legislative balancing that residency would induce an 
employee to perform better.80  Moreover, the Court implied that the 
issue was a political question best resolved by the political process and 
surmised that the plaintiffs should bring their grievances “to the local 
legislative body” or directly to the state legislature.81 
Subsequent to the Kennedy decision, in Detroit Police Officers Ass’n 
v. City of Detroit, the U.S. Supreme Court dismissed, for lack of a 
substantial federal question, a challenge to targeted residency 
requirements for police officers in the city of Detroit.82  The Michigan 
Supreme Court previously held that there was a rational basis for 
requiring police officers to reside in the city as a condition of 
employment because their job duties were naturally distinguishable 
“from all other city employees.”83  The Court used the specific 
example of the requirement incumbent upon all police officers to 
carry their weapons during off-duty hours as evidencing that the 
police were “a semi-military organization subject at all times to 
immediate mobilization, which distinguishe[d] this type of 
employment from every other in the classified service.”84 
Justice Brennan’s concurrence argued that deference should be 
accorded to the legislative determination and proffered some insight 
into the ends sought through the requirement.85  He posited that the 
legislature sought to coordinate an improved relationship between 
the African American residents and the police force of Detroit.86  The 
residency requirement had been enacted when Detroit’s population 
was over forty percent African American and the surrounding 
suburbs had a less than ten percent African American population.87  
Statistics indicate that only a dismal five percent of Detroit’s police 
force was African American in 1967, thereby providing support for 
Justice Brennan’s allusions to a possible legislative desire to maintain 
a racial balance between Detroit, its suburban population, and its 
police force.88  Being that a dismissal for want of a substantial federal 
question was a decision on the merits, Detroit Police Officers Ass’n 
 
 80  Kennedy, 148 A.2d at 476. 
 81  Id. 
 82  Detroit Police Officers Ass’n v. City of Detroit, 190 N.W.2d 97, 97 (Mich. 
1971), appeal dismissed, 405 U.S. 950 (1972). 
 83  Id. at 97–98. 
 84  Id. at 98. 
 85  Id. (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 86  Id. 
 87  Id. 
 88  See FOGELSON, supra note 61, at 248. 
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signaled that the protection of the powerful stare decisis doctrine 
could now be invoked to combat challenges to continuing residency 
requirements for police officers levied under the Equal Protection 
Clause.89 
2. More Rational Reasons for Residency Requirements 
and Challenges Claiming a Fundamental “Right to 
Travel” 
A fuller exposition of the potential rational reasons for 
enforcing a continuing residency requirement came from the 
California case Ector v. City of Torrance, where the plaintiff, a city 
librarian, challenged a residency requirement.90  The librarian urged 
the court to apply heightened scrutiny for violations of her “right to 
travel” announced as fundamental in Shapiro.91  Foreshadowing the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s later decision in McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil 
Service Commission,92 the California Supreme Court rejected the 
plaintiff’s argument to apply the Shapiro fundamental right analysis by 
relegating it to a narrower application limited to durational residency 
requirements only.93  The California Supreme Court also accepted 
the issue as Justice Weintraub had professed it in Kennedy and applied 
a rational basis test to the equal protection challenge.94  While 
accepting the reasoning of Detroit Police Officers Ass’n regarding the 
natural and distinguishing characteristics of police officers and the 
need for emergency personnel, the California Supreme Court 
enumerated a list submitted by amici curiae indicating multiple 
rational ends sought to be obtained through continuing residency 
requirements.95  The court found that any of the potential reasons 
 
 89  See Ahern v. Murphy, 457 F.2d 363, 364 (7th Cir. 1972). 
 90  514 P.2d 433, 434 (Cal. 1973). 
 91  Id.; see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630–31 (1969) (acknowledging 
that the right to travel is ordinary and fundamental to the Federal Union). 
 92  424 U.S. 645 (1967). 
 93  Ector, 514 P.2d at 436–37. 
 94  Id. 
 95  Id. at 436.  Specifically the court provided that: 
the promotion of ethnic balance in the community; reduction in high 
unemployment rates of inner-city minority groups; improvement of 
relations between such groups and city employees; enhancement of the 
quality of employee performance by greater personal knowledge of the 
city’s conditions and by a feeling of greater personal stake in the city’s 
progress; diminution of absenteeism and tardiness among municipal 
personnel; ready availability of trained manpower in emergency 
situations; and the general economic benefits flowing from local 
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provided would serve as a rational basis for the residency 
requirement, and thus upheld imposing its strictures on the public 
librarian.96 
The New Jersey Supreme Court first confronted a challenge to a 
continuing residency requirement predicated on a fundamental 
“right to travel” argument in Abrahams v. Civil Service Commission, 
where the same Newark residency requirement that had been 
attacked in Kennedy under the New Jersey State Constitution’s equal 
protection grounds was once again challenged in light of the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Shapiro.97  The Abrahams case was 
decided at a time when residency requirements had become 
attractive policy tools for legislatures to combat the “white flight” of 
public employees who began moving to the suburbs in mass exodus 
from large cities during the 1960s.98  Newark’s experience was 
particularly emblematic; the city lost 70,000 white residents between 
the years of 1960 and 1967.99  This figure included the growing 
number of public employees that retained two addresses, one in the 
city and one in the suburbs, as a means of deceptively complying 
while flouting the legislative intent of the residency requirement.100  
New Jersey later closed this loophole in its decision in Mercadante v. 
City of Paterson, where the Court held that police and firefighters 
maintaining dual addresses, one inside the city and one outside, 
failed to comply with the statutory residency requirement.101 
In Abrahams, a law department secretary had provided a Newark 
address when applying for her position in 1966 and moved into 
Newark in 1967.102  In 1970, however, she left Newark to live in nearby 
Union and was terminated from her position for violating the 
residency requirement.103  The secretary argued that the ordinance 
violated her constitutional right to travel under the precedent of 
 
expenditure of employees’ salaries were all rational ends sought to be 
obtained through the use of residency requirements. 
Id. 
 96  Id. 
 97  Abrahams v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 319 A.2d 483, 484 (N.J. 1974).  For a 
discussion of the Kennedy decision, see text accompanying notes 5, 7, 59–61. 
 98  See Johnson, Warchol & Bumphus, supra note 64, at 45. 
 99  See id. 
 100  See id. 
 101  266 A.2d 611, 613–14 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1970), affirmed, 275 A.2d 440 
(1971). 
 102  Abrahams v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 319 A.2d 483, 484 (N.J. 1974). 
 103  Id. 
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Shapiro and further that the ordinance was enforced discriminatorily 
against her.104  The Court quickly dismissed the precedential value of 
Shapiro as applied to the continuing residency requirement at issue, 
noting the distinction between durational and continuing residency 
requirements.105  Furthermore, the Court approvingly cited the 
rational basis factors first enunciated by the California Supreme 
Court in Ector in support of enforcing continuing residency 
requirements.106  The specific example of lowering unemployment in 
Newark to be achieved via the residency requirement was accepted as 
a legitimate policy end for the requirement.107 
With regard to the argument of selective enforcement, the 
Court’s majority took the position that the factual record had 
unearthed no evidence of a policy of non-enforcement.108  
Interestingly, the Court qualified this with a reminder that there 
would “be no excuse for continued non-enforcement of the 
ordinance in the future if in fact that ha[d] been the case in the 
past.”109  In actuality, the factual record had offered more than scant 
evidence of selective enforcement.110  Aside from the law 
department’s nine attorneys, who were statutorily exempt from the 
requirement, a statistical sample taken of 142 other department 
employees had revealed that twenty-one were non-residents.111 
Justice Clifford concurred in the judgment of Abrahams though 
he lamented, “[i]t is difficult to escape the impression that we are 
reviewing this case with blinders on.”112  Justice Clifford was referring 
to the fact that the secretary had failed to raise questions in the trial 
court regarding the propriety of certain statutory exemptions 
afforded to other classes of employees that would have strengthened 
the argument regarding the unconstitutionality, and hence overall 
 
 104  Id. at 484–85 (citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)).  The 
secretary also argued that the “special circumstances” exception provided for in the 
ordinance was void for vagueness, but this issue is not considered further.  Id. 
 105  Id. at 486. 
 106  Id. at 489. 
 107  Id. 
 108  Abrahams, 319 A.2d at 490–91. 
 109  Id. 
 110  Id. at 485. 
 111  Id. The dissenting Justice Pashman argued forcefully that this significant 
number of non-complying residents combined with official knowledge constituted 
arbitrary discrimination that should render the requirement unenforceable under 
the precedent of Kennedy.  See id. at 503 (Pashman, J., dissenting). 
 112  Id. at 491 (Clifford, J., concurring). 
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enforceability, of the residency requirement.113  Specifically, Justice 
Clifford was referencing statutory exemptions that the state 
legislature had passed that prohibited municipalities from using 
residency as a condition for “original appointment, continued 
employment, promotion, or for any other purpose . . .” for police114 
and firefighters.115  Thus, Justice Clifford may have implicitly been 
alluding to the need for the requirement to be uniformly applied to 
all classes of employees.116 
The dissenting Justice Pashman viewed the residency 
requirement unconstitutional as both “an infringement upon the 
right to travel unsupported by a sufficiently compelling interest to 
justify the restriction” and as a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause.117  With regard to the issue of selective enforcement that the 
plaintiff raised, Justice Pashman acknowledged that the majority’s 
holding effectively would require a stenographer to reside inside of 
the city, while a police officer would be free to live where he or she 
may choose.118  Pashman described Chief Justice Weintraub’s earlier 
refusal to find a compelling state interest or fundamental right 
protected by the New Jersey Constitution as being motivated by 
Weintraub’s personal disavowal of such concepts as ambiguous and 
 
 113  Id. 
 114  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:14-122.1 (West 2010).  In its entirety the statute 
provides: 
No municipality shall pass any ordinance, resolution, rule, regulation, 
order or directive, making residency therein a condition of 
employment for the purpose of original appointment, continued 
employment, promotion, or for any other purpose for any member of a 
police department and force and any such ordinance, resolution, rule, 
regulation, order or directive in existence on the effective date of this 
act or passed hereafter shall be void and have no force or effect. 
Id. 
 115  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:14-9.1 (West 2010).  The statutory language reads the 
same as § 40A:14-122.1, with the only exception being a change of the “police” to 
“fire.” Id. 
 116  The theoretical basis of Justice Clifford’s statutory exemptions for certain 
classes of employees is arguably relevant to the exemption process incorporated into 
the New Jersey First Act, particularly the blanket exemption for persons with 
specialized skill or knowledge at institutions of higher education.  This exemption is 
the result of reasoned opinion that it is necessary to help keep New Jersey’s higher 
public education competitive. See § 52:14-7.  Contrarily, one can only surmise that an 
exemption for police and firefighters from targeted localized residency requirement 
is anything other than the result of a successful lobby. 
 117  See Abrahams, 319 A.2d at 491 (Pashman, J., dissenting). 
 118  Id. at 498. 
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unhelpful to judicial decision-making.119  With respect to 
“fundamental” constitutional rights and the varying levels of scrutiny 
under Equal Protection challenges, Justice Weintraub had previously 
elaborated: 
[i]f a right is somehow found to be “fundamental,” there 
remains the question as to what State interest is 
“compelling” and there, too, we find little, if any, light. 
Mechanical approaches to the delicate problem of judicial 
intervention under either the equal protection or the due 
process clauses may only divert a court from the meritorious 
issue or delay consideration of it. Ultimately, a court must 
weigh the nature of the restraint or the denial against the apparent 
public justification, and decide whether the State action is arbitrary. 
In that process, if the circumstances sensibly so require, the 
court may call upon the State to demonstrate the existence 
of a sufficient public need for the restraint or the denial.120 
Justice Pashman rejected Weintraub’s position, reasoning that 
although there was no per se fundamental right to public 
employment, the state could not condition the privilege of public 
service on the surrender of a constitutional right.121  In this way, 
Justice Pashman cast the issue in a light more favorable to the 
burdened public employee and surmised the right ought to be 
protected under the New Jersey State Constitution as an undue 
restriction on the right to travel.122 
A separate but related scrutiny question that had created some 
confusion among courts after Shapiro was whether a compelling 
government interest standard of review applied to all residency 
requirements or just the durational variety.  Despite a footnote in 
Shapiro making it explicitly clear that the case’s holding was narrow 
and not meant to apply to bona fide continuing residency 
requirements,123 a federal court in New Jersey applied a compelling 
government interest standard and, based on the precedent of Shapiro, 
upheld a residency requirement for police and firefighters under this 
 
 119  See Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 282 (N.J. 1973). 
 120  Id. (emphasis added). 
 121  See Abrahams, 319 A.2d at 498 (Pashman, J., dissenting). 
 122  Id. at 495. 
 123  Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 637 n.21 (1969) (“We imply no view of 
the validity of waiting-period or residence requirements determining eligibility to 
vote, eligibility for tuition-free education, to obtain a license to practice a profession, 
to hunt or fish, and so forth.”). 
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heightened standard.124  The Krzewinkski v. Kugler, misapplication of 
the Shapiro precedent was also adopted in Fraternal Order of Police 
Youngstown Lodge No. 28 v. Hunter, where the court used the 
compelling state interest standard to strike down a police residency 
requirement.125 
In 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court directly confronted the 
question of Shapiro’s precedential value in McCarthy v. Philadelphia 
Civil Service Commission, where a firefighter challenged the 
termination of his sixteen-year tenure of employment.126  The 
firefighter had relocated his principal residence from Philadelphia to 
New Jersey in violation of a residency requirement and argued that 
his termination violated his fundamental right to travel under the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause.127  The Court’s per curiam opinion 
briskly recounted that a targeted residency requirement for police 
officers in Detroit was found “not irrational” by virtue of an earlier 
dismissal for want of a substantial federal question in Detroit Police 
Officers Ass’n.128  Further, the Court directly specified that the 
constitutional right of interstate travel, though offering the more 
stringent compelling governmental interest standard of review, was 
not implicated by a continuing residency requirement under the 
precedent of Shapiro.129 
3. Summation of Case Law 
The New Jersey Supreme Court first confronted the 
constitutionality of comprehensive residency requirements in Kennedy 
and the decision became the foundation for subsequent 
constitutional challenges.130  The Kennedy decision served as an early 
indication that the New Jersey Supreme Court would defer to 
legislative determinations and squash the proliferation of future 
claims against comprehensive residency requirements under the 
State Constitution.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s dismissal of Detroit 
Police Officers Ass’n reinforced that the Kennedy decision had 
 
 124  Krzewinkski v. Kugler, 338 F. Supp. 492, 489 (D.N.J. 1972) (citing Shapiro, 394 
U.S. 618). 
 125  Fraternal Order of Police Youngstown Lodge No. 28 v. Hunter, 49 Ohio App. 
2d 185, 198 (Ohio App. Div. 1973), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 977 (1976). 
 126  424 U.S. 645, 645 (1976). 
 127  Id. 
 128  Id. at 645–46. 
 129  Id. at 646–47. 
 130  See discussion supra Part II.B.1. 
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appropriately deferred to the legislature’s balancing.131  Moreover, 
the Ector decision from California supplied an assortment of policy 
objectives sought to be obtained through the use of continuing 
residency requirements.132  In Abrahams, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court followed the precedent of the Kennedy decision and the 
enumeration of policy justifications from Ector.  Additionally, the 
Abrahams decision signified the New Jersey Supreme Court’s rejection 
of the argument that continuing residency requirements violated a 
right to travel protected under the compelling governmental interest 
standard of Shapiro.133  Though at least one federal court in New 
Jersey had applied a heightened scrutiny to a continuing residency 
requirement under the precedent of Shapiro,134 any aspirations for 
more scrupulous review under the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
became largely foreclosed by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
McCarthy.135 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS 
This Comment examines three constitutional arguments that 
potential plaintiffs could levy against continuing residency 
requirements, with a focus on the jurisprudence of New Jersey and 
the recently enacted New Jersey First Act.  The first argument posits 
that imposing a residency requirement as a condition of public 
employment violates a fundamental right to travel preserved under 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Federal Constitution.  
This argument additionally considers the possibility that residency 
requirements could violate a fundamental right to travel secured by 
state constitutional provisions.  The second argument propounds that 
continuing residency requirements impermissibly discriminate 
between classes of persons in violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause.  This section similarly considers the applicability of equal 
protection arguments brought under parallel provisions found in 
state constitutions.  The final constitutional argument considers the 
possibility of challenging a statewide residency requirement, such as 
the New Jersey First Act, as an impermissible burden on interstate 
commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause, under a Dormant 
Commerce Clause analysis. 
 
 131  See discussion supra Part II.B.1. 
 132  See discussion supra Part II.B.2. 
 133  See discussion supra Part II.B.2. 
 134  See discussion supra Part II.B.2. 
 135  See discussion supra Part II.B.2. 
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A. A Fundamental Right to Travel? 
In 1869, the U.S. Supreme Court described the purpose of the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause136 expansively, acclaiming that “it 
was undoubtedly the object of the clause in question to place the 
citizens of each State upon the same footing with citizens of other 
States, so far as the advantages resulting from citizenship in those 
States are concerned.”137  Despite the suggestive sweeping 
applicability of the Privileges and Immunities Clause in Paul v. 
Virginia, its use has been severely restricted and tremendously 
circumscribed by the jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court—
including in regard to continuing residency requirements. 
After the McCarthy decision,138 the controversy over residency 
requirements seemed settled to the extent that rational basis review 
would apply to equal protection challenges, and that the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause would not offer the same compelling 
government interest standard applied to the durational residency 
requirements of Shapiro.139  Nevertheless, this did not foreclose all 
opportunities for states to offer a more encompassing constitutional 
right to travel that would subject continuing residency requirements 
to a higher level of constitutional scrutiny than the protections 
available under the federal system.  The Federal Constitution merely 
sets a floor providing a set of the most basic rights assured to each 
citizen.140  As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in Pruneyard Shopping 
Center v. Robbins, each state may “adopt in its own Constitution 
 
 136  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to 
all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”). 
 137  Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 180 (1869). The entirety of the passage provides: 
It was undoubtedly the object of the clause in question to place the 
citizens of each State upon the same footing with citizens of other 
States, so far as the advantages resulting from citizenship in those 
States are concerned. It relieves them from the disabilities of alienage 
in other States; it inhibits discriminating legislation against them by 
other States; it gives them the right of free ingress into other States, 
and egress from them; it insures to them in other States the same 
freedom possessed by the citizens of those States in the acquisition and 
enjoyment of property and in the pursuit of happiness . . . . It has been 
justly said that no provision in the Constitution has tended so strongly 
to constitute the citizens of the United States one people as this. 
Id. 
 138  McCarthy v. Phila. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 424 U.S. 645 (1967); see discussion 
supra Part II.B.2. 
 139  See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 637 (1969); see discussion supra Part 
II.B.3. 
 140  See Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980). 
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individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the 
Federal Constitution.”141 
In Donnelly v. City of Manchester, a case decided before McCarthy, 
the New Hampshire Supreme Court considered a schoolteacher’s 
challenge to a city ordinance imposing a comprehensive residency 
requirement on the city’s employees, effective twelve months from 
the initial date of employment.142  The court posited that the 
requirement impinged upon the schoolteacher’s fundamental right 
protected under both the State and Federal Constitutions.143  
Although public employment was not inherently a fundamental right, 
the “privilege” of being publicly employed could not “be conditioned 
upon a surrender of a fundamental constitutional right.”144  Thus, 
instead of deferring to the legislature, the Donnelly court utilized a 
fundamental rights standard that considered “the importance of the 
public benefit . . . balanced against the seriousness of the restriction 
of the private right sought to be imposed.”145  The court focused on 
the broad application of the ordinance, which extended to every 
public employee, and concluded that the legislative end of bringing 
economic benefits unto the city could not justify such an 
overinclusive ordinance.146  The Donnelly court did not discount the 
possibility of a constitutionally sound residency requirement if 
properly limited in scope of application: 
There is nothing in the record before us nor have any 
reasons been advanced which would justify the broad 
restrictions of this ordinance. We do not say that there are no 
employees whose residence near their place of duty may not be 
important enough to justify a restriction upon their place of 
residence but if such restrictions are permissible as to some 
this does not justify the broad and all inclusive requirement 
that all employees live within the city limits.147 
After the McCarthy decision, there was a question about the 
continued vitality of Donnelly since it had explicitly relied on the 
 
 141  Id. 
 142  Donnelly v. City of Manchester, 274 A.2d 789, 789–90 (N.H. 1971). 
 143  Id. at 791. 
 144  Id.  This mirrors Justice Pashman’s framing of the issue in his dissent in 
Abrahams.  See Abrahams v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 319 A.2d 483, 498–99 (N.J. 1974) 
(Pashman, J., dissenting). 
 145  Donnelly, 274 A.2d at 791. 
 146  See id. at 792. 
 147  Id. at 791 (emphasis added). 
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Privileges and Immunities Clause in the Federal Constitution.148  
Subsequent to the McCarthy decision, the town of Manchester 
reenacted a comprehensive residency requirement identical to the 
one formerly struck down as unconstitutional by the New Hampshire 
Supreme Court, with the only difference being the addition of a 
grandfather clause that barred the requirement from affecting 
current employees.149  Despite the overshadowing precedent of 
McCarthy rejecting a claim under the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause, the New Hampshire Supreme Court utilized an elevated 
constitutional scrutiny under the New Hampshire State Constitution 
and struck down the Manchester comprehensive residency 
requirement a second time in Angwin v. City of Manchester.150 
Donnelly is a paradigm of a state’s constitution proffering a right 
to travel above and beyond the protections afforded by the Federal 
Constitution.  The recognition of a fundamental right to live where 
one chooses while still possessing the opportunity to hold a position 
in public employment under the New Jersey State Constitution, albeit 
unlikely, would arguably provide a constitutional form of protection 
against legislative decisions seeking to restrict an important freedom.  
While it would not foreclose the possibility of residency requirements 
for certain classes of employees, heightened judicial scrutiny is 
capable of circumscribing legislative residency requirements that 
include classes of employees without justification. 
A perceived benefit of this type of judicial review may be that it 
allows for a more scrupulous analysis of the facts as they exist with 
regard to the particular circumstances of the jurisdiction seeking to 
enforce a continuing residency requirement.  In Seabrook Police Ass’n 
v. Town of Seabrook,151 the Supreme Court of New Hampshire 
addressed the constitutionality of a residency requirement providing 
that all police officers must reside in the town as a condition of 
employment.152  The court scrutinized the factual circumstances 
intensely, pointing to “the existence of a nuclear power plant, a 
greyhound racing track, a resident beach population in an area 
accessible only by bridge, and a town population that doubles in the 
summer months” as mitigating factors weighing in support of the 
 
 148  See Angwin v. City of Manchester, 386 A.2d 1272, 1272 (N.H. 1978). 
 149  Id. 
 150  See id. at 1273. 
 151  635 A.2d 1371 (N.H. 1993). 
 152  Id. at 1372. 
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residency requirement.153  The court also separated police officers 
from other classes of employees when it acknowledged that the off-
duty presence of officers served an important element of the policing 
function.154  Thus, the court surmised that the totality of the police 
officers’ duties distinguished their services from other employees and 
warranted the unequal treatment resulting from the residency 
requirement.155 
Comparing New Jersey’s approach with that of New Hampshire 
demonstrates the benefits proffered by elevated constitutional 
scrutiny.  The Donnelly and Angwin decisions explicitly affirm that a 
comprehensive residency requirement will be found to violate the 
fundamental right to travel guaranteed by elevated protection under 
the New Hampshire State Constitution.156  Seabrook Police Ass’n further 
elucidates that a targeted residency requirement for police officers in 
a town with unique factual circumstances can be upheld despite the 
elevated scrutiny.157  This suggests that allowing the judiciary to 
evaluate the propriety of the legislative means and ends may 
appropriately circumscribe the scope of residency requirements to 
those situations where they are legitimately connected with the 
employee’s employment performance, particularly when the 
legislature has ignored or improperly balanced constitutional 
concerns.158 
The New Jersey First Act’s attempt to institute a comprehensive 
residency requirement for every public employee in the state of New 
Jersey would likely be found unconstitutional under the review 
provided by the New Hampshire State Constitution, as being an 
overinclusive and illegitimate infringement upon the constitutional 
rights of the employees.  New Jersey’s approach has historically been 
asymmetrical, if not completely opposed, to the New Hampshire 
 
 153  Id. at 1374. 
 154  See id. 
 155  Id. at 1375. 
 156  See Angwin v. City of Manchester, 386 A.2d 1272, 1272–73 (N.H. 1978) 
(reinforcing and reapplying the heightened protections of Donnelly under the New 
Hampshire State Constitution). 
 157  See Seabrook Police Ass’n, 635 A.2d at 1375. 
 158  One could, however, criticize that a court is improperly legislating by 
imposing its own views instead of deferring to the legislator. This comment 
fundamentally assumes that the balancing of rights approach asserted in Donnelly 
would more readily safeguard personal liberty and the pursuit of happiness to a 
greater extent than rational basis scrutiny. 
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approach to continuing residency requirements.159  The legislative 
exemptions in New Jersey for police and firefighters create a statutory 
framework that is hard to defend on a practical basis.160  Effectively, 
these exemptions create a system where secretaries, waste disposal 
employees, and municipal office workers can be required to live in a 
city, county, or municipality as a condition of employment, while 
police and firefighters, the personnel with a presence arguably 
necessary during off-duty hours or emergency situations, are exempt 
from the requirement.  Moreover, comprehensive residency 
requirements have routinely been upheld in New Jersey since Kennedy 
and Abrahams, and the pending New Jersey First Act is not likely to be 
subjected to any elevated or more stringent review.  While an elevated 
standard of scrutiny would likely provide the judiciary with tools 
capable of circumscribing the applicable scope of residency 
requirements to only those employees where residency is a sensible 
extension of the employees’ duties, this remains an unlikely 
possibility in light of New Jersey’s past jurisprudence.161 
In sum, arguments professing that continuing residency 
requirements violate a right to travel derived from the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of the Federal Constitution will prove unavailing 
in light of the McCarthy decision.  The New Hampshire approach 
offers the possibility of a more elevated scrutiny in the form of 
balancing the public interest served by the requirement against the 
loss of liberty suffered by the individual.  This is accomplished 
through provisions in New Hampshire’s State Constitution, not the 
Federal Constitution’s Privileges and Immunities Clause.  
Nevertheless, the initial Kennedy decision and the continued 
deference to legislative balancing in New Jersey seem to assure that 
any argument positing that residency requirements violate a 
fundamental right to travel retained under the State Constitution will 
fail. 
 
 159  Compare Angwin v. City of Manchester, 386 A.2d 1272, 1272–73 (N.H. 1978) 
(heightened protections under the New Hampshire State Constitution), with 
Kennedy v. City of Newark, 148 A.2d 473, 475 (N.J. 1959) (framing the issue in a way 
that prevents heightened constitutional scrutiny). 
 160  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:14-9.1 (West 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:14-122.1 
(West 2010). 
 161  This naturally would lead one to conclude that emergency workers and other 
classes of employees that respond to emergency situations as part of their 
employment function, such as firefighters and police officers, are the best candidates 
for residency requirements. 
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B. Equal Protection Challenge 
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause 
provides, in pertinent part, that “no state shall . . . deny any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”162  In Detroit 
Police Officers Ass’n and again in McCarthy, the U.S. Supreme Court 
applied rational basis review to continuing residency requirements 
targeted towards police and firefighters.163  In United States v. Carolene 
Products Co.,164 the U.S. Supreme Court described rational basis review 
as providing a presumption of deference to economic legislation.165  
As economic legislation, the New Jersey First Act would enjoy a 
presumption of constitutionality against a challenge under the Equal 
Protection Clause that would only be subverted if the plaintiff could 
persuade the court the underlying policy reasons for the rule were 
wholly irrational.  The presumption of constitutionality is difficult to 
surmount, and “statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any 
state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.”166 
Continuing residency requirements create two classes of 
persons, those within the ambit of the requirement, and all others 
who, due to misfortune or personal choice, live outside the scope of 
the covered geographic area.  Whereas the former have the 
opportunity to obtain public employment within the applicable 
jurisdiction of the residency requirement, the latter are foreclosed 
from the employment opportunity unless they are able and willing to 
relocate.  The statutory classification thus creates two classes, 
residents and non-residents, and extends or forecloses the privilege 
of having an opportunity to obtain public employment on that basis.  
For example, the New Jersey First Act would render any non-resident 
of New Jersey ineligible for public employment positions throughout 
the state unless qualified for one of the narrow exemptions.167 
The rational basis legitimizations for residency requirements 
first enumerated in Ector have effectively functioned as an acute 
summation of the potential legislative policy reasons for instituting a 
 
 162  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 163  See Detroit Police Officers Ass’n v. City of Detroit, 190 N.W.2d 97, 103 (Mich. 
1971), appeal dismissed, 405 U.S. 950 (1972); McCarthy v. Phila. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 
424 U.S. 645, 645–46 (1976) (per curiam). 
 164  304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
 165  Id. at 152. 
 166  McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961) (citation omitted). 
 167  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14-7(b) (West 2010). 
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continuing residency requirement.168  An acknowledgment of the 
stringency of rational basis review and its virtual unwavering 
deference to legislative decisions requires that each of these possible 
legislative motivations be proven independently irrational to overturn 
the legislation’s presumption of constitutionality.  Thus, each 
potential legislative reason independently can serve as a sufficient 
means of satisfying rational basis review, and must be examined on an 
individual basis for legitimacy. 
1. The Public Interest Theory 
The public interest justification for continuing residency 
requirements—sometimes referred to as the public coffer theory—
posits that a state may restrict the expenditure of its resources to the 
benefit of its own members, and at the exclusion of all others.169  
Operating under the assumption of the public coffer theory and 
viewing public employment as a privilege delegated from the state to 
the general public, the theory provides that these public employment 
positions can be restricted based on state membership alone because 
residents of the state provide the tax monies essential to the state’s 
functioning.170  Thus, by imposing a residency requirement, a state 
can better ensure that the funds it dispenses to public employees are 
more likely to be redistributed back into its own economy, thereby 
passing a tax benefit back to the state.171  This also appears to be the 
primary legislative rationale behind the New Jersey First Act, as 
evidenced by Senator Norcross’s statement: “If you want a paycheck 
from New Jersey taxpayers, you should live here and pay your taxes 
here.”172 
The New York statute upheld in People v. Crane is emblematic of 
the use of the public interest doctrine to legitimize a legislative 
preference for a state’s own citizens.  The New York statute at issue in 
Crane forbade employers for public works projects from employing 
 
 168  See Ector v. City of Torrance, 514 P.2d 433, 436 (Cal. 1973), cert. denied, 415 
U.S. 935 (1974); Abraham v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 319 A.2d 483, 489 (N.J. 1974) 
(citing the factors from Ector with approval). 
 169  See People v. Crane, 108 N.E. 427, 429 (N.Y. 1915), affirmed, 239 U.S. 195 
(1915). 
 170  See id. 
 171  See id. 
 172  Senator Norcross Proposes State Residency Law, POLITICKER NJ (Mar. 9, 2010), 
http://politickernj.com/droseman/37554/senator-norcross-proposes-state-
residency-law. 
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aliens as part of their labor force.173  Justice Cardozo, then sitting on 
the New York Court of Appeals, avowed that the court was not 
defending the statute as a legislative attempt to promote efficiency 
but rather to promote the welfare of the “men preferred,” and “as a 
legitimate preference of citizens.”174  Reasoning that this employment 
was a “privilege,” as opposed to a “right,” the New York Court of 
Appeals accordingly held that the state could discriminate in favor of 
citizens.175 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court approved the public coffer 
theory as advanced in People v. Crane, the theory later fell into disfavor 
and was repudiated in numerous cases, including Shapiro.176  In 
Shapiro, Justice Brennan rejected the argument that a state could 
apportion community benefits based upon previous tax 
contributions.177  Under the guise of this logic, a state could defend 
the denial of police, fire, or emergency services to a taxpayer who has 
failed to contribute his or her fair share as determined by the state.178  
The U.S. Supreme Court later explained that the public interest 
doctrine turned on an assumption that a state could apportion 
“privileges,” but not “rights,” upon the basis of citizenship.179  This 
distinction and accompanying assumption, however, were repudiated 
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Graham.180 
In Sugarman v. Dougall, city officials of New York argued that 
rejection of the public interest doctrine in Graham was limited to 
public assistance, and that the precedent of Crane allowed the state of 
New York to exclude aliens from competitive civil service positions.181  
 
 173  See Crane, 108 N.E. at 428. 
 174  Id. at 429–30. 
 175  Id. at 430.  While it is true that the issue in Crane dealt with aliens, as opposed 
to out of state residents, the geographical and technological limitations during 1915 
when the decision came down likely diminished the likelihood of residents’ 
commuting regularly to serve in public employment in other states.  In this sense, the 
rule may have effectively limited these positions to New York state citizens. 
 176  See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 632 (1969). 
 177  Id. at 632–33. 
 178  See id. at 632–33. 
 179  See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971). The Supreme Court has 
rejected a State’s ability to apportion different benefits according to classifications as 
“rights” or “privileges” in various cases subsequent to People v. Crane aside from 
Graham.  See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) (citations omitted); Sherbert 
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963). 
 180  Graham, 403 U.S. at 374.  This case partly dealt with whether a state could 
impose a durational residency requirement on welfare benefits for aliens.  See id. at 
366. 
 181  See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 644 (1973). 
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While Crane was not explicitly overruled, it was deemed non-
controlling, and the U.S. Supreme Court held that the New York 
statute was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.182 
Despite the overtly protectionist undertones of the public coffer 
theory, it was one of the primary justifications that the New Jersey 
Supreme Court accepted in Kennedy.183  Chief Justice Weintraub 
articulated that it was within the constitutional discretion of the 
legislature to utilize residency as a condition of public employment to 
“advance the economy of the locality which yields the tax revenues.”184  
The New Jersey Supreme Court maintained this line of reasoning in 
Abrahams even after the Supreme Court had retracted the vitality of 
the theory.185 
Some advocates in favor of residency requirements posit that 
removal would induce middle class public workers to leave the cities, 
thereby triggering an increase in urban plight and a corresponding 
plummet in property values.186  The recent retraction of a residency 
requirement in Minneapolis, however, did not create the exodus of 
middle class public workers as opposition had anticipated.187  
Concerns that property values would plummet ten percent also failed 
to materialize.188  Nonetheless, Minneapolis may be a unique example 
and there is no assurance that these outcomes would apply to New 
Jersey.  Putting public policy considerations aside, the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s repudiation of the public interest theory should serve to 
invalidate its legitimacy as a rational basis for requiring an employee 
to live within a geographic area as a condition of employment. 
2. Promotion of Ethnic Balance and Curing 
Unemployment 
In Ector, the California Supreme Court cited the factors of 
promoting ethnic balance and providing employment opportunities 
as capable of withstanding scrutiny under the rational basis test.189  
 
 182  Id. at 645–46. 
 183  See Kennedy v. City of Newark, 148 A.2d 473, 476 (N.J. 1959). 
 184  See id. 
 185  See Abrahams v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 319 A.2d 483, 485 (N.J. 1974). 
 186  See, e.g., MPS Report, supra note 60, at 18. 
 187  See Jim Nichols, Minneapolis, Like Cleveland, Had Residency Rule Overturned, But 
Worst Fears About Flight Didn’t Materialize, METRO-CLEVELAND.COM (June 20, 2009, 5:03 
AM), http://blog.cleveland.com/metro/2009/06/minneapolis_like_cleveland 
_had.html. 
 188  See id. 
 189  See Ector v. City of Torrance, 514 P.2d 433, 436 (Cal. 1973). 
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These legislative intentions appear laudable in light of the urban 
flight occurring during the 1970s and the resulting racial tension in 
inner-cities.  In Detroit Police Officers Ass’n, a targeted residency 
requirement for police officers was described as a legislative device to 
“promote a feeling of trust, confidence and fraternity” between the 
Detroit police and citizenry.190  Despite the potential use of a 
residency requirement to promote minority representation in public 
employment or to cure the urban ill of unemployment generally, 
factual circumstances may stifle continuing residency requirements 
from achieving this end. 
A residency requirement’s ineffectiveness in promoting the 
legislative end of ethnic balance was observed in a more recent case 
where the NAACP successfully challenged the New Jersey township of 
Harrison’s residency requirement under Title VII in federal court.191  
The town of Harrison had always adhered to a strict policy of limiting 
the hiring pool of public employees for uniformed and non-
uniformed positions to applicants from the town.192  At the time when 
the case was brought in 1991, only Harrison residents had ever been 
considered for uniformed positions.193  This led to the avowed 
unintended consequence of an African American never holding a 
position within the town.194  Harrison sought to defend the 
requirement and relied heavily on Abrahams, but the reasons were 
rejected as “too nebulous and insubstantial” to justify the disparate 
impact under the more demanding Title VII standard.195 
While Newark Branch, NAACP v. Harrison is a special case 
involving a challenge under Title VII, the circumstances establish that 
presuming that the promotion of ethnic balance is a policy 
justification served by residency requirements is capricious because 
residency does not ensure a certain racial or ethnic composition.196  
 
 190  Detroit Police Officers Ass’n v. City of Detroit, 190 N.W.2d 97, 98 (Mich. 1971) 
(Brennan, J., concurring), appeal dismissed, 405 U.S. 950 (1972). 
 191  Newark Branch, NAACP v. Harrison, 940 F.2d 792, 804 (3d Cir. 1991).  Since 
the challenge was brought under Title VII, the ordinance was subjected to a standard 
above and beyond rational basis that required the town of Harrison to produce 
evidence that the residency requirement furthered a legitimate business goal in a 
significant manner.  Id. at 803. 
 192  Id. at 795. 
 193  Id. at 796. 
 194  Id. 
 195  Id. at 801–02, 805. 
 196  Harrison was not the only town in northern New Jersey with residency 
requirements that the NAACP targeted for their racially discriminatory effects.  See 
generally Fort Lee Drops Hiring Rule to Settle N.A.A.C.P. Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1992, at 
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Whereas Harrison faithfully enforced its requirement, the 
homogenous racial composition of the town rendered the residency 
requirement an impediment to achieving racial balance in public 
employment.197  In short, more direct hiring practices would better 
provide a means of promoting ethnic balance in jurisdictions where 
this is a proper legislative end.198 
In regard to unemployment, continuing residency requirements 
can serve as a legislative solution to decrease local unemployment 
figures.199  After the most recent fiscal crisis in 2008, some public 
administrators in towns throughout northern New Jersey began 
reconsidering the use of residency requirements that were on the 
books but apparently unenforced until recent times.200  In Hoboken, 
thirty city employees residing outside of the town were told to move 
back to the town or be fired as a response to the town facing a huge 
tax increase.201  In Jersey City, the current status of the requirement 
suffers from massive non-compliance, with the municipal clerk 
estimating that 1,237 of the city’s 2,940 public employees live outside 
of its limits.202 
If Jersey City, or any other place similarly situated, undertook a 
 
7 (noting that Fort Lee, Clifton, Harrison, Kearny, West Orange, Bayonne, and 
Millburn all faced challenges to their residency requirements from the NAACP and 
that the town of Fort Lee had dropped its rule as a response); Terry Pristin, Judge 
Allows Residency Rule, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1996, at 1 (highlighting that the challenge 
against the Bayonne residency requirement was unsuccessful). 
 197  Newark Branch, NAACP, 904 F.2d at 795.  At the time the case was decided, 
ninety-eight percent of the town of Harrison was white.  See Court Fight Doesn’t Save 
Residency Requirement, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1998, at 6. 
 198  See Abrahams v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 319 A.2d 483, 497 (1974) (Pashman, J., 
dissenting) (describing the issue pertaining to who the city hires and not the issue of 
residency requirements). 
 199  See S. S1730, 214th Conditional Veto (N.J. 2011). 
 200  See Ricardo Kaulessar, Residency Requirements Cause Controversy, 
HUDSONREPORTER.COM (Jan. 6, 2009), http://www.hudsonreporter.com/view/full 
_story/1211333/article-Residency-requirements-cause-controversy-Bayonne—other-
towns-will-force-city-workers-to-live-here-. 
 201  Id.  Bayonne’s town administrator apparently circulated an internal memo 
reminding all non-uniformed employees that they needed to comply with the 
residency requirement or face termination, and in West New York the town’s mayor 
is considering instituting a comprehensive residency requirement that would 
requirement all newly hired employees to reside in the town.  Id. 
 202  Id.  Recall that there is a statutory exemption for police and firefighters in 
New Jersey that would apply to a number of the non-complying Jersey City public 
employees.  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:14-9.1 (West 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:14-
122.1 (West 2010).  Thus, theoretically a sizeable portion of those employees have 
statutory exemptions. 
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more strenuous enforcement of its residency requirement, the result 
would almost necessarily entail a reduction in unemployment.  As 
employees are confronted with the difficult choice of abandoning 
their positions or changing their homes, a certain number of 
employees will refuse to relocate and thus be terminated for non-
compliance with the requirement.203  Since the effect of a residency 
requirement is to restrict the flow of labor from outside sources by 
limiting employment opportunities to a jurisdiction’s residents, some 
of a town’s otherwise unemployed residents will receive a competitive, 
if not exclusive, advantage to obtain these employment positions.  
The detriment shifts to any and all otherwise eligible persons who are 
stifled from obtaining employment by the requirement. 
The original bill proposed by Senator Norcross would have 
required all current employees of New Jersey to become residents of 
the state within two and a half years of enactment.204  This would have 
required eight percent (approximately 6,075) of the state’s 
employees to either move to New Jersey or forfeit their jobs.205  
Municipal and county workers throughout New Jersey residing 
outside of the state would have found themselves in the same forced 
situation.206  Fortunately for current employees, the New Jersey First 
Act, as approved, contains a grandfather clause for all current 
employees so long as they have no break in public service greater 
than seven days.207  Without the grandfather clause, the New Jersey 
First Act would have remedied unemployment by securing a certain 
number of positions that were previously held by New Jersey’s 
neighbors from Delaware, Pennsylvania, and New York, but were lost 
because the affected workers were either unable or unwilling to 
relocate to New Jersey.  As the bill currently stands, it will help to 
remedy future unemployment by permanently foreclosing public 
employment positions to all residents living outside of New Jersey 
unwilling to relocate there.208  The massive bridges spanning the 
natural boundaries created by the Hudson and Delaware Rivers 
 
 203  See Werner Z. Hirsch & Anthony M. Rufolo, Economic Effects of Residence Laws on 
Municipal Police, 17 J. URB. ECON. 335, 338 (1985). 
 204  See S. S1730, 214th Leg. (N.J. 2010). 
 205  Jersey May Grandfather PA Residents, THE MORNING CALL (Mar. 31, 2010), 
http://articles.mcall.com/2010-03-31/news/all-newjerseyresidency-
03312010_1_residency-bill-new-jersey-senate-williams-townships. 
 206  See id. 
 207  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14-7 (West 2010). 
 208  Id. The one major exception will be for persons at institutions of higher 
education and those exempted by the five-member committee.  Id. 
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between New Jersey and its neighboring states signify a testament to 
our states’ connectedness that ought to be reflected in our policies 
towards one another in both the public and private sector.  As State 
Representative Steve Santarsiero of the thirty-first legislative district of 
Pennsylvania lamented, “We shouldn’t be passing laws that set up 
barriers between states, either in the private or the public sector. . . .  
There are people out there working hard . . . and it shouldn’t matter 
where they live.”209  As commonsense as Santarsiero’s statement is, it 
does little to change the benefit of insulating our own tax base and 
public employment positions by restricting the flow of outside labor. 
3. Community Identity and Stake in the City 
An amalgamation of the Ector factors suggests that residency 
requirements forge a beneficial community identity between public 
employees and the community-at-large, thereby causing these 
employees to work harder by way of their knowledge and 
commitment to the community.210  In addition, this sense of 
community interest also purportedly results in a reduction of 
tardiness and absenteeism.211  An individual’s subjective feeling of a 
greater affinity to a community is difficult to measure, if calculable at 
all.  A recent qualitative study on the effect of residency requirements 
in providing community interest benefits revealed that officers 
disagreed that such benefits were obtained by imposition of residency 
requirements.212 
Whatever particular community benefits would accrue from a 
residency requirement, more objective measurements would provide 
insight into what is actually happening and affecting employees than 
mere speculation.  Absenteeism and tardiness could be remedied 
through attendance policies that accrue benefits for complying 
employees and punish those failing to meet the requisites.  
Employees could be tested on any knowledge of the city that is 
relevant to the performance of duties.213  The possibility of addressing 
 
 209   Santarsiero Pens Letter to N.J. Legislators Opposing Residency Requirements for State 
Employees, PENNSYLVANIA HOUSE DEMOCRATIC CAUCUS (Mar. 12, 2010), 
http://www.pahouse.com/pr/031031210.asp. 
 210  Ector v. City of Torrance, 514 P.2d 433, 436 (Cal. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 
935 (1974). 
 211  Id. 
 212  See Johnson, Warchol & Bumphus, supra note 61, at 55. These officers’ 
responses are likely biased to the extent they would prefer not to be subject to the 
requirements. 
 213  For example, if a fire department thinks that use of a residency requirement is 
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objectives of the community through means capable of objective 
measurement suggest that depriving the individual of his choice of 
where to live while retaining a position of employment on the basis of 
a community of interest theory may be an excess burden on liberty.  
Nevertheless, under a rational basis level of scrutiny, this elusive and 
ephemeral reason will continue to be accepted as it is difficult to 
either repudiate or substantiate. 
4. Adequate Response to Emergency Situations 
The most consistent reason proffered in Ector and other cases for 
enacting continuing residency requirements has been to ensure an 
adequate and prompt response time during emergency situations 
unique to a particular class of employees.214  In Detroit Police Officers 
Ass’n, the Michigan Supreme Court highlighted the distinguishing 
characteristics of a police officer’s duties and considered these 
differences to be dispositive in creating a rationally distinguishable 
class that could be subjected to discriminatory treatment by the 
legislature.215  In McCarthy, the U.S. Supreme Court also resolved the 
constitutionality of a targeted residency requirement for firefighters 
in favor of the city of Philadelphia after a challenge by an employee 
who relocated to New Jersey.216  Prior to the McCarthy decision, earlier 
court decisions from various jurisdictions had also concluded that 
police were distinguished from other classes of public employees 
upon rejecting the application of comprehensive residency 
requirements to public school teachers.217 
Although perhaps the most defensible basis for imposing 
residency requirements, the need to preserve a presence in a city or 
geographical area should only apply to those classes of employees 
with incumbent duties that require their presence during off-duty 
 
important to ensure that all firefighters know the quickest ways around the town to 
ensure prompt response time while on duty, a test could easily be devised to ensure 
that the employee is aware of what route to take in a given emergency situation.  
Moreover, it could be problematic to presume that residency necessitates certain 
knowledge about the city that is pertinent to the position.  The person might lack the 
expected and required knowledge irrespective of living within the purview of the 
requirement. 
 214  See Ector, 514 P.2d at 436; see also Detroit Police Officers Ass’n v. City of Detroit, 
190 N.W.2d 97, 97–98 (1971), appeal dismissed, 405 U.S. 950 (1972). 
 215  See Detroit Police Officers Ass’n v. City of Detroit, 190 N.W.2d 97, 97–98 
(Mich. 1971). 
 216  McCarthy v. Phila. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 424 U.S. 645, 645 (1976) (per curiam). 
 217  See Hanson v. Unified Sch. Dist., 364 F. Supp. 330, 334 (D. Kan. 1974); 
Donnelly v. City of Manchester, 274 A.2d 789, 790–91 (N.H. 1971). 
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hours.  This rationale is particularly applicable to emergency 
response employees.  In any event, the New Jersey First Act does not 
adopt this legislative reasoning since the scope of the requirement 
effectively bars those living outside of the state from obtaining any 
public employment position within the state.218  In effect, the law 
would allow a firefighter in Cape May to live in Bergen County, 
despite disallowing a Hunterdon County firefighter the option of 
living in New Hope, Pennsylvania—a town directly across the 
Delaware River adjacent to Hunterdon County.  This seems to suggest 
that the emergency response time rationale is only applicable to a 
geographically smaller residency requirement circumscribed to a 
county, city, or municipality. 
The theoretical underpinnings of the application of the 
rationale have fewer implications for New Jersey firefighters and 
police as these employees already enjoy a statutory exemption from 
residency requirements that was obtained during the 1970s.219 As 
firefighters and police are the archetypal emergency positions held 
by the publicly employed, the legislative purpose of enacting this 
statewide exemption from localized residency requirements is 
questionable.  As a practical matter, it is arbitrary reasoning to 
require a publicly employed secretary to live in a town, when police 
and firefighters are exempted from the requirement despite having 
emergency employment duties that necessitate proximate residency 
to a geographic location.  In Trenton, where eighty percent of the 
“rank-and-file” firefighters live outside the city, the department has 
had to rely more on volunteer support because some employees, 
living over forty-five minutes away, cannot respond in time.220  This 
calls into question the ends that residency requirements in New 
Jersey seek to promote and whether this utilization is problematic.221 
While the emergency response justification seems strongest in 
light of the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in McCarthy 
and Detroit Police Officers Ass’n dealt with targeted residency 
requirements for police and firefighters, New Jersey’s legislative 
exemptions have reduced the reasonableness of this justification for 
 
 218  See S. S1730, 214th Leg. (N.J. 2010). 
 219  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:14-9.1 (West 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:14-122.1 
(West 2010). 
 220  Jay Romano, Challenging Residency as Job Requirement, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1991, 
at 1.  In Camden, New Jersey, approximately ninety percent of the rank and file 
firefighters live outside of the city.  Id. 
 221  See infra Part III.C. 
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enforcing residency requirements.  Aside from the potential 
detriment to public safety that may occur when police and 
firefighters do not observe residency requirements, there also seems 
to be a fundamental unfairness to selectively exempt these classes of 
employees while imposing the requirement on other employees 
where justifications are more tenuous.  Multiple jurisdictions and the 
U.S. Supreme Court have specifically identified police and firefighter 
as classes of employees with emergent employment duties that 
distinguish their position from other public workers.  The 
commonsense of this logic is indubitable, and it ought to be reflected 
in the legislature’s balancing. 
5. Rational Basis Scrutiny of Residency Requirements 
Although many of the legislative reasons underpinning the use 
of residency requirements can be called into question directly, the 
New Jersey judiciary has remained conscious of the legislative 
balancing and reticent to weigh in on any policy judgments regarding 
residency requirements.222  Other jurisdictions have directly addressed 
residency requirements beyond their surface policy justifications, 
thereby mitigating some of the judicial deference under rational basis 
scrutiny historically accorded by the New Jersey Supreme Court. 
In a case predating McCarthy, a teacher in Kansas challenged the 
applicability of a comprehensive residency requirement incumbent 
on all public employees of Wyandotte County to live within its 
geographic jurisdiction.223  Although the Court applied a compelling 
interest standard, it posited that the classification was “essentially 
arbitrary” and would have been invalidated even if subjected to a 
rational basis review.224  In Lewis v. City of Kinston, a police officer, 
upon being informed that he needed to move within the county or 
face termination, challenged the enforceability of a city ordinance 
requiring all city employees to reside in Lenoir County under the 
Equal Protection Clause.225  The North Carolina court acknowledged 
that Ector supplied the applicable rational basis level of scrutiny to 
review the ordinance, and summarized that the city’s reasons for the 
requirement were to ensure that the individual would: (1) contribute 
to the city’s tax base; (2) vote in city elections; (3) participate in the 
 
 222  See Abrahams v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 319 A.2d 483, 485 (N.J. 1974); Kennedy v. 
City of Newark, 148 A.2d 473, 475 (N.J. 1959). 
 223  See Hanson v. Unified Sch. Dist., 364 F. Supp. 330, 330–31 (D. Kan. 1974). 
 224  Id. at 334. 
 225  Lewis v. City of Kinston, 488 S.E.2d 274, 275 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997). 
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city’s community; and (4) respond quickly in the event of an 
emergency situation.226  Although the court accepted that these were 
rational ends, it still found the ordinance unconstitutional under the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution and also under 
the North Carolina State Constitution.227  Since the ordinance 
provided the plaintiff with an option of living not only within the city 
of Kinston but also in the surrounding Lenoir County, the court 
reasoned that there was no reasonable assurance that the residency 
requirement would further the aforementioned goals of the 
residency requirement.228  The court also rejected the emergency 
response time exception because the location of the city of Kinston 
and the shape of Lenoir County rendered parts of the county farther 
from the city of Kinston than other neighboring counties. 229  In the 
eyes of the court, this constituted an arbitrary and irrational 
connection between the legislative means and proclaimed objective.230 
The Lewis case serves as evidence that plaintiffs could potentially 
utilize the rational basis test to invalidate a residency requirement if 
there is not a sufficient nexus between the legislative objective and 
the use of a residency requirement to obtain that objective.  The case 
is exceptional in that the court scrupulously examined the relations 
between the legislative ends and means, and it is questionable 
whether such a review would occur in New Jersey in light of the past 
jurisprudence of Abrahams and Kennedy.  Nevertheless, Lewis 
illustrates that a challenge under a rational basis standard of review 
could be successful under certain circumstances. 
In sum, challenges to continuing residency requirements under 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution are likely to 
falter in most circumstances.  While the more recent Lewis case from 
North Carolina establishes the possibility of rational basis scrutiny 
invalidating a comprehensive residency requirement, the scrupulous 
 
 226  Id. at 276. 
 227  See N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19 (“No person shall be taken, imprisoned, or 
disseized of his freehold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any 
manner deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the law of the land.  No 
person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws; nor shall any person be 
subjected to discrimination by the State because of race, color, religion, or national 
origin.”); Lewis, 488 S.E.2d at 277. 
 228  Lewis, 488 S.E.2d at 277. 
 229  Id.  Specifically, the requirement would not ensure plaintiff would vote in 
municipal elections, contribute to the city’s tax base, or obtain an interest in the 
community.  Id. 
 230  Id. 
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review by which the Lewis court applied rational basis scrutiny was 
atypical.231  New Jersey, in particular, has exercised a continued 
deference towards implementation of continuing residency 
requirements since the earliest Equal Protection challenges were 
levied under the Federal or New Jersey Constitution.232  Thus, any 
challenges to the New Jersey First Act employing an equal protection 
argument, whether under the State or Federal Constitution, will have 
an improbable chance at success in light of past New Jersey 
jurisprudence regarding residency requirements. 
C. Dormant Commerce Clause 
Article I of the Federal Constitution empowers Congress “to 
regulate commerce . . . amongst the several states.”233  Although not 
explicitly stated, the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted a negative 
power into the Commerce Clause empowering the judiciary to 
invalidate laws that disproportionately burden interstate commerce.234  
When applied to a state law in putative violation of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, a court must first determine whether the 
ordinance or statute at issue discriminates against interstate 
commerce.235  Upon finding that the ordinance or statute at issue 
burdens interstate commerce, a court must then proceed to 
determine whether the burden is “clearly excessive” when weighed 
against the “putative local benefits.”236  Thus, the first step for 
establishing a cognizable Dormant Commerce Clause claim requires 
showing that the public employment positions foreclosed to non-
residents by a given residency requirement are subjects of interstate 
commerce burdened by the restriction on the flow of labor. 
The public employment relationship is similar to the 
employment relationship in the private sector in the sense that the 
employee proffers his time and energy in return for some form of 
compensation.  At some basic level, the employee contracts to sell his 
labor to an employer, who is coincidentally the government in the 
context of public employment.  In New Jersey, the government’s total 
 
 231  See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 232  See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 233  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 234  See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 579 
(1997) (invalidating a tax scheme that disproportionately disadvantaged out-of-
staters in favor of the interests of local residents). 
 235  C & A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994). 
 236  Id. 
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salary expenditure for public employees throughout the entire state 
for the month of March 2009 approximated $2.6 billion, a substantial 
expenditure of revenue.237  The sheer magnitude of New Jersey’s total 
state expenditure on public employment alone, nearly $30 billion 
annually, affects interstate commerce.238  The restriction on the flow 
of labor accomplished by any statewide residency requirement 
arguably puts a burden on interstate commerce by preventing an 
otherwise capable labor force from a neighboring state from entering 
the labor market.  It is specifically this flow of labor between states 
that the New Jersey First Act targets.  The negative economic impact 
on the neighboring state would perhaps constitute a burden on 
interstate commerce sufficient to implicate a Dormant Commerce 
Clause analysis. 
Proceeding under the assumption that the public employment 
positions foreclosed by the New Jersey First Act constitute 
“commerce” under the Commerce Clause, a plaintiff challenging a 
statute carries the initial burden of showing discrimination against 
the commerce of another state.239  Statutes that are discriminatory on 
their face against the economic interests of out-of-state residents have 
been deemed invalid unless there was no alternative means to 
advance the local interest.240  Where a state regulates even-handedly 
and only incidentally favors local economic interests, the statute will 
be “upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly 
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”241  In Pike v. Bruce 
Church, the U.S. Supreme Court further provided that a balancing 
approach considering the burden on interstate commerce weighed 
against the putative local benefit, while taking into consideration 
other plausible means of achieving the legislative end, should be the 
approach taken to resolve the tension.242 
With regard to the New Jersey First Act, the legislative ends 
sought debatably stem from protectionist economic motivations.  The 
 
 237  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2009 Annual Survey of Public Employment and Payroll 
of New Jersey, http://www2.census.gov/govs/apes/09stlnj.txt (last updated Jan. 2012). 
 238  See id. 
 239  Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979). 
 240  See City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628 (1978).  An ordinance that 
discriminates against out-of-state residents exclusively as a local economic 
protectionist measure will be not be sustained despite discriminating against some in-
state and out-of-state residents.  See Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 
356 (1951). 
 241  Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
 242  Id. 
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bill’s sponsor, Senator Norcross, advanced the bill as a piece of long-
overdue legislation capable of providing a significant source of 
revenue during the tough economic times witnessed since 2008.243  Its 
protectionist nature sparked concern from Pennsylvania State 
Representative Steve Santarsiero, who urged for the incorporation of 
the grandfather clause that was eventually added to the Senate 
Committee substitute and subsequently adopted in the final bill.244  
Other Pennsylvania legislators also threatened to introduce an 
identical residency bill as a response to the New Jersey First Act when 
it was still pending legislation.245  These threats of retaliatory measures 
embody a fear of feuding between and among the states leading to 
the creation of protectionist laws.  As the U.S. Supreme Court 
asserted in Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig Inc., “The Constitution was framed 
under the dominion of a political philosophy less parochial in range.  
It was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several states 
must sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and 
salvation are in union and not division.”246 
In some respects, a challenge to a continuing residency 
requirement under the Dormant Commerce Clause is stronger if the 
requirement is statewide as opposed to a more localized residency 
requirement limited to a county or city.  For example, the New Jersey 
First Act, as enacted, forecloses all future opportunities to obtain 
public employment positions to persons residing outside of New 
Jersey.247  Whereas a localized residency requirement only affects a 
smaller pool of outside residents, the larger the scope of the 
requirement, the greater the restriction on the flow of labor and 
resulting burden on interstate commerce.  In this sense, the New 
Jersey First Act and similar residency requirements embody a form of 
economic protectionism more likely to be invalidated by judicial 
review under the functioning of the Dormant Commerce Clause than 
those circumscribed to smaller geographical localities. 
A Dormant Commerce Clause challenge to the New Jersey First 
 
 243  See Senator Norcross Proposes State Residency Law, supra note 172. 
 244  Jersey May Grandfather PA Residents, supra note 205. 
 245  Id.  Pennsylvanian State Senator Lisa Boscola did propose an identical bill but 
only as part of a protest to the requirements and not as part of a serious agenda to 
institute the requirement.  See Lisa Boscola Introduces Pa. Residency Bill to Get N.J 
Legislators’ Attention, EXPRESS-TIMES, June 24, 2010, 
http://www.lehighvalleylive.com/today/index.ssf/2010/06/lisa_boscola_introduces
_pa_res.html. 
 246  294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935). 
 247  See S. S1730, 214th Leg. (N.J. 2010). 
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Act or a similar comprehensive residency requirement could 
potentially provide a more favorable standard of review than could be 
obtained under rational basis scrutiny.  Specifically, when using this 
review, a court would balance the legislative rationales for residency 
requirements, as summarized in Ector, against the burden on 
interstate commerce.  This would invite a greater level of scrutiny 
than that offered by rational basis review, especially in light of the 
tremendous deference it accords to continuing residency 
requirements.  A Dormant Commerce Clause analysis would bring 
any statewide comprehensive residency requirement, such as the New 
Jersey First Act, into proper economic focus.  Thus, a challenge 
under the Dormant Commerce Clause, if accepted, could provide an 
elevated level of constitutional scrutiny as compared to the standards 
afforded under Equal Protection and Privileges and Immunities 
challenges. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In New Jersey, the judiciary has long regarded residency 
requirements as a constitutional exercise of legislative power 
rationally related to promoting an acceptable end.248  The New Jersey 
First Act, despite its benefits to New Jersey residents, would fashion a 
protectionist measure against our neighboring states.  The exclusion 
of our neighbors from public employment opportunities could also 
provoke retaliatory legislation that would be to the detriment of many 
New Jersey residents.249 
The cost of imposing a residency requirement comes in the form 
of a loss of liberty that falls primarily on the individuals forced to quit 
their positions or relocate.  Even with the use of a grandfather clause, 
such as was incorporated in the final version of the New Jersey First 
Act, the loss of liberty still affects all future out-of-state residents as 
their ability to find public employment positions is inevitably 
constrained to a more limited market.  Residency requirements may 
also have the effect of filtering applicants from positions solely based 
on their place of domicile, threatening to create local political 
oligarchies.  In short, a merit-based system aimed at creating the most 
capable public workforce ought to be the objective of hiring practices 
 
 248  See discussion supra Part II.B.1. 
 249  See Lisa Boscola Introduces Pa. Residency Bill to Get N.J Legislators’ Attention, supra 
note 245.  A bill like the one proposed by Senator Lisa Biscola of Pennsylvania is 
inherently more problematic and would injure any New Jersey resident seeking 
public employment in Pennsylvania.  See id. 
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for any municipality or government.  Although these ends may be 
sought tangentially through the use of residency requirements, the 
causal nexus between these ends and means is lacking. 
Limited legal remedies remain available for challenging 
residency requirements.  The McCarthy case has virtually foreclosed 
the possibility of the success of any fundamental right to travel 
challenges to residency requirements under the Federal Privileges 
and Immunities Clause.  This remains especially pronounced in light 
of the fact that the New Jersey Supreme Court is unlikely to overrule 
its earlier decision in Kennedy or follow the precedent of Donnelly.  
Given the substantial deference the New Jersey Supreme Court 
enunciated in Kennedy, it is also unlikely that arguments under the 
New Jersey State Constitution calling for a fundamental right of 
travel, applicable to continuing residency requirements, would 
succeed.  While this avenue of challenging the New Jersey First Act is 
plausible under the State Constitution, its chances of success are 
improbable. 
Detroit Police Officers Ass’n further established that rational basis 
scrutiny would be the constitutional standard of review for challenges 
to continuing residency requirements under the Equal Protection 
Clause.  Challenges under the Fourteenth Amendment have a 
plausible chance of succeeding on certain factual circumstances, but 
this cannot be assured given the tremendous presumption of 
deference accorded to the legislature. 
Finally, a plausible argument could be made that continuing 
residency requirements violate the Federal Constitution under a 
Dormant Commerce Clause analysis.  This argument has never been 
directly levied at a comprehensive residency requirement and the 
feasibility of the claim remains questionable.  In particular, it hinges 
on an assumption that statewide employment restrictions affect and 
burden interstate commerce.  Assuming the burden exists, this 
argument offers the potential of a balancing approach that would 
perhaps be more favorable than the rational basis scrutiny proffered 
under the Equal Protection Clause. 
Even in the absence of judicial relief, a question remains as to 
whether the New Jersey First Act is the proper political solution.  
While the New Jersey legislature has contrived of a manner to 
exclude out-of-state residents from a large sector of New Jersey’s labor 
market, other states have completely eradicated the residency 
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requirement by way of state statute.250  If the motive of the New Jersey 
First Act and other residency requirements is merely to insulate the 
local tax base or bolster employment through geographic favoritism, 
we ought to abhor these measures and seek alternatives that do not 
impinge on the free movement of labor and liberty interests of the 
individual.  The irony rendering this conclusion mostly unlikely, 
however, can be grasped by common sense.  Simply put, restricting 
public employment positions to a single state’s residents has the dual 
advantage of increasing the number of local jobs, a concern of 
constituents, and increasing tax collection, a prime concern of 
legislatures.  The constituency populations most affected by these 
laws, moreover, reside in neighboring states and cannot help 
themselves by voting out the politicians that have deprived them of 
public employment.  With a dual benefit to be obtained and no 
cognizable detriment to the political popularity of the enacting 
legislators, it is of little surprise that the New Jersey First Act was 
passed. 
As time passes and more New Jersey residents inure benefits 
from the New Jersey First Act by obtaining public employment 
positions to the exclusion of otherwise eligible out-of-state residents, 
one can portend that a political inertia favoring the Act will develop.  
This inertia will render it dubious that the individual liberty lost, 




 250  See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-2-15.1 (exempting police officers and firefighters); 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-2-15.2 (exempting municipal employees); see also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 
16-12-9 (exempting public school teachers and administrators); City of Lima v. State, 
909 N.E.2d 616, 621 (Ohio 2009) (upholding legislative ban on all residency 
requirements throughout the state of Ohio). 
